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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Andrea Wolfe 
 
Master of Science  
 
Department of Psychology 
 
March 2011 
 
Title:  Military Influence Tactics:  Lessons Learned in Iraq and Afghanistan 
 
 
For most influence attempts in everyday life, success makes life easier and failure 
is a disappointment, not a tragedy.  When U.S. soldiers deployed overseas attempt to 
influence civilians, however, success can save lives and failure can be deadly.  Along 
with the high stakes consequences of influence attempts, soldiers face the challenges of 
bridging differences in language, culture, beliefs, and agendas.  
The current study examined cross-cultural influence attempts made by deployed 
soldiers, contributing to existing influence research by examining influence attempts in a 
complex and challenging wartime environment.  Survey data from 228 military personnel 
with deployment experience to Iraq and Afghanistan revealed that empathy, respect, prior 
relationships, and familiarity with influence targets predicted success.  Five influence 
technique clusters emerged, and use of technique clusters involving resources and 
positive feelings were more successful than negative tactics.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Influence is a part of everyday life, and we often try to influence others without 
even realizing it.  For most ordinary influence attempts, success makes life easier and 
failure is a disappointment, not a tragedy.  When influence attempts are made by U.S. 
soldiers deployed overseas, however, success can save lives and failure can be deadly.  
Influence attempts to change anti-American beliefs, increase cooperation, and decrease 
resentment towards a centralized Iraq government, attacks against U.S. Forces, violence, 
and improvised explosive device (IED) placement all can potentially save lives if 
successful.   
 In addition to high stakes, influence attempts of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan have additional challenges compared to everyday attempts of civilians.  
Deployed soldiers trying to influence civilians most likely have differences in language, 
culture, beliefs, and appearance; typically only one is wearing a uniform and carrying a 
weapon while the other is unarmed and in civilian clothes, and agendas.  Compared to the 
influence attempts studied most often in the influence literature (Branzei, 2002; Higgins, 
Judge, & Ferris, 2003; Leong, Bond, & Fu, 2006), soldiers have both an increased 
motivation to succeed in their influence attempts combined with greater complexity and 
more challenges.  
Influence research rarely tackles the challenges of understanding influence in this 
type of complex environment, and there is little research on influence in different cultures 
(Branzei, 2002, p. 205).  One meta-analysis by Higgins, Judge, and Ferris (2003) on 
influence tactics and work outcomes between 1973 and 2000 examined 31 studies.  
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However, over this 27 year span, only two of these were conducted outside the United 
States, and both were in India (Higgins, Judge, & Ferris, 2003).  Additionally, while there 
was limited cultural diversity between studies, there was even less emphasis and analysis 
on cross-cultural influence within studies.   
Elements of cultural psychology, influence, war, and military training must be 
integrated to improve our understanding of the challenges and relative effectiveness of 
different approaches for deployed soldiers who are attempting to influence culturally 
different local populations. The study reported here attempts to broaden the scope of the 
existing influence literature by looking at cross-cultural influence attempts of soldiers in a 
deployed environment.  It also aims to provide practical recommendations regarding 
influence for military members operating in these environments.  Based on surveys of 
soldiers who have interacted with local populations while deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the study assesses what features of influence attempts predict failure or 
success.  
Influence 
 
It is a fundamental mistake to see the enemy as a set of targets.  The enemy in war 
is a group of people.  Some of them will have to be killed.  Others will have to be 
captured or driven into hiding.  The overwhelming majority, however, have to be 
persuaded. 
 Frederick Kagan (2003).  
 
Influence techniques.  Capturing and categorizing the ways in which individuals 
influence others has resulted in a wide range of classifications ranging from a single 
technique to more than 160 (Rhoads, 2007).  Currently, there is no consensus on which of 
the many taxonomies is the most useful (Toon, 2002, p. 33) in assessing variation in 
influence attempts. 
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An example of very broad categories is positive versus negative techniques.  A 
more refined taxonomy is Cialdini’s (1993, p. 1) six “weapons of influence” used as sales 
and marketing techniques:  Reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, 
liking, authority, and scarcity. Yukl and Tracey (1992) identify nine influence techniques; 
rational explanations, inspirational appeal, consultation, ingratiation, exchange, personal 
appeal, coalitions, legitimation, and pressure.  Moving on to more elaborate taxonomies, 
Levine and Wheeless (1990) created a list of 53 compliance tactics by reviewing the 
work of nine previously published taxonomies.  Addressing even more subtle nuances is 
Rhoads’s (2007) list of over 160 influence techniques.    
In between the extreme poles of influence technique classification is Marwell and 
Schmitt’s (1967) famous study of 16 influence techniques, which is the model for 
analysis in the current study.  In Marwell and Schmitt’s study, 608 college students 
indicated their likelihood of using each of the 16 techniques for each of four scenarios.  A 
factor analysis using oblique varimax rotation led to categorization of the 16 techniques 
into five factors; rewarding activity, punishing activity, expertise, activation of 
impersonal commitments, and activation of personal commitments. Examples of 
techniques that fit the five factors:   Promise: If you comply, I will reward you 
(Rewarding factor);  Threat: If you do not comply, I will punish you (Punishing factor); 
Positive Expertise: If you comply you will be rewarded because of “the nature of things” 
(Expertise factor); Positive Self-feeling: You will feel better about yourself if you comply 
(Impersonal commitments factor); and Altruism: I need your compliance very badly, so 
do it for me (Personal commitments factor). 
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This set of influence tactics was selected for use in the current study because the 
total number of tactics, 16, was not too overwhelming and complex.  Because  
participants had varying levels of education and many did not have psychological or 
influence training, it was important to present techniques that were clear and concise, and 
(with some updating of the wording)  the description of the 16 techniques and how they 
differed from each other was easy to grasp.  Using 16 techniques also offered a good 
balance of variation between techniques, potential for meaningful clustering, and a 
survey that was not too long.   
Influence attempts in different cultures.  Influence is inherently social because 
it requires an influencer and a target.  Most influence research to date, however, focuses 
on influencers and targets such as supervisors and subordinates or marketing within the 
United States.  Many of these studies focus on activities which are “almost always 
initiated through some form of face-to-face negotiations” (Graham, Mintu, & Rodgers, 
1994, p. 73). Studies with a cross-cultural design typically compare the results of 
influence attempts in different countries, among influencers and targets who are within 
the same culture.  
An example is Leong, Bond, and Fu’s (2006) study of influence tactic selection.  
They looked at 488 managers in the U.S. and three Chinese societies.  The targets of 
influence were upward, downward, and lateral and varied by power differential.  They 
found that nurturing, gentle persuasion, comprised of “ingratiation tactics and 
persuasion” with “reason or fact” (p. 104) was perceived to be more effective for 
American managers while Mainland Chinese found this to be the least effective.  Also, 
there were no cultural differences for the rated effectiveness of contingent control 
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techniques “comprised tactics involving the use of contingent punishment, exchange of 
benefits, collegial support and assertiveness” (Leong, Bond, & Fu’s, 2006, p. 104).  The 
effectiveness of these techniques, however, are based on between country comparisons, 
not cross-cultural comparisons.   
 Another cross-cultural study examined influence attempts of 223 MBA students 
from the U.S., Romania, and Japan, and found cultural values were related to choice of 
influence tactic (Branzei, 2002).  In this study, influence attempts were aimed at 
achieving organizational goals. Participants read four scenarios describing interactions 
between “individuals from different national cultures within a specific organizational 
context” and indicated their preference for nine different influence tactics (Branzei, 2002, 
p. 207).  Using a MANCOVA, they found that national culture was correlated with 
influence tactic preference.  After controlling for cultural value dimensions, preferences 
for the use of three of nine tactics-- ingratiation, exchange, and legitmation-significantly 
differed between countries.  Americans preferred to use rational tactics, inspirational 
appeals, and consultation, respectively, similar to the tactic preference of Japanese 
participants, but not Romanians.  While respondents’ culture was measured, cross-
cultural differences between the influencer and target were not considered.  Influence 
tactic preferences of Americans in specific organizational contexts are difficult to apply 
to cross-cultural military contexts when cross-cultural interactions between participants 
and targets of influence are not assessed.  
As these examples illustrate, most cross-cultural influence studies do not directly 
investigate influence attempts between two people from different cultures.  Instead the 
comparison is whether the tendency to favor some influence tactics over others varies 
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based on the culture or nationality of the person making the influence attempts.  Whether 
these choices (and the outcomes of these choices) might be affected by differences 
between influencers and targets’ social and cultural backgrounds tends to be overlooked.   
Hence it is difficult to know to what extent the findings would generalize to cross-cultural 
interactions between soldiers and civilians.  
Many studies in business attempting to assess the role of cross-cultural 
negotiations examine separate cultures’ influence and negotiation styles, then compare 
and contrast national techniques and style approaches (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998).  One 
example is a case study by Abu-Nimer (1996) looking at Western (Ohio) and Middle 
Eastern (Israel) procedures for resolving disputes.  These negotiations were performed in 
separate countries by culturally similar negotiators, and then compared across cultures.  
Differences between cultures included balancing versus changing power relationships, 
groups versus individual negotiation focus, interventions based on differing social norms 
and values, potential for future interactions, and the use of third party interveners (Abu-
Nimer, 1996).  This comparison of negotiation techniques between cultures, while 
informative, may not be applicable to understanding the cultural interaction present if 
individuals from Ohio and Israel attempt to negotiate. 
 Another example of comparing cultures without cross-cultural interaction used 
700 business people from the United States, Canada (both Anglophone and 
Francophone), Mexico, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, Taiwan, China, and Korea (Graham, Mintu, & Rodgers, 1994). Participant 
pairs attempted to increase joint profit in 30 minutes, and results suggests the degree to 
which both negotiators and partners utilized problem-solving approaches that impacted 
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joint profit across cultural groups.  However, these differences do not address the styles 
and successfulness of cross-cultural interactions.  
Graham’s (1985) study of cross-cultural sales negotiations of 98 Japanese and American 
participants living in the United States is one example where different cultural 
interactions were present.  For pairs composed of either two Americans, two Japanese, or 
one American and one Japanese participant for cross-cultural negotiations, results 
indicated that cultural composition did not directly affect negotiation outcomes, but was 
correlated with bargaining strategies; for cross-cultural negotiations, strategies were rated 
more representational (Graham, 1985, p. 141-142).   
Military and Culture 
 
Knowledge of culture goes well beyond not shaking with your left hand, or not 
showing the bottoms of your feet.  For example, if you chase a terrorist into a 
building, you must knock before entering.  Our soldiers now do this. It sounds 
ludicrous, but if you don’t knock, and as a result you see a woman uncovered 
(maybe just her face) you could capture your terrorist but create several new ones.  
A husband or brother or both may feel obliged to take revenge for the insult, to 
restore family honor, regardless of their political beliefs. 
 Richard Muller (2004) 
 
The role of culture in military operations.  Although the literature on culture 
does not agree upon a single definition of culture, it can be conceptualized as a shared 
way of life with common goals, beliefs, attitudes, language, and modes of action (Berry, 
Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992).  In cross-cultural influence attempts, culture may play 
a role in language differences, perceptions, expectations, trust, and ultimately success.  
Hajjar (2010) defines cross-culturally competent soldiers as having the “knowledge, 
attitudes, and behavioral repertoire and skill sets that military members require to 
accomplish all given tasks and missions involving cultural diversity” (p.249).  
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Although the U.S. military operates in many culturally different regions, the 
importance of cultural competent soldiers is a relatively new concept.  Shay’s (1994) 
interviews with U.S. soldiers who fought in the Vietnam War revealed that many viewed 
Vietnamese as the enemy, vermin, unfeeling automata, incapable of any competencies 
worthy of notice, and primitive.  They went to war “ignorant” of Vietnamese culture, and 
their misinterpretation of cultural events often helped strengthen their stereotypes (Shay, 
1994, p.106).   
When U.S. troops invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, there was no 
emphasis on cultural training (Komarow, 2004).  Due to this oversight, flawed cultural 
assumptions at both the strategic and tactical levels led to problems for military 
operations (Hajjar, 2010; Watkins, 2007).   Soldiers “often pointed with their index 
fingers, patted down women for weapons and failed to recognize sacred sites — all 
behavioral blunders in Iraq — and often found themselves at a loss when it came to 
interacting with locals” (Hajjar, 2010; Watkins, 2007, p. 2).  These mistakes could 
contribute not only to poor perception of the U.S. military, but also be counterproductive 
in accomplishing missions because of a lack of support of local Iraqis.  
 As incidents related to cultural misunderstandings or lack of regional knowledge 
increased and were amplified in the media, the need for cultural training became 
unmistakable.  The military began describing culturally competent soldiers as a “force 
multiplier”, increasing the capabilities of the ‘force’ and the likelihood of mission 
accomplishment, rather than “an embarrassment which may result in costly mistakes” 
(Lewis, 2006, p. 2).  Another recent publication asserts that the “ability to understand and 
appreciate the role and impact of culture on policy and strategy is increasingly seen as a 
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critical strategic thinking skill” (Kim, 2009, p. vii). Cultural competence is described as a 
new way of thinking about problems and finding effective solutions for deployed 
soldiers, a process which needs to be taught, understood, and practiced (Daniel, 2010).  
Soldiers moving through a village on foot, questioning locals about a recent event, or 
attending a village meeting are all routine situations involving cross-cultural interaction 
that could potentially escalate to violence over cultural misunderstandings.   
 The current view on the cultural competency in soldiers suggests that cross-
cultural understanding can help forge relationships and settle disputes.  For deployed 
soldiers, cultural competency may improve the ability to conduct operations and achieve 
objectives without the use of force.  Culturally competent soldiers who also understand 
influence techniques should be more effective communicators, which should increase the 
likelihood of mission success.  The “more competent a Soldier is in understanding self 
and foe in terms of customs, language and culture, the better the Soldier is able to 
accomplish the mission” (Lewis, 2006, p. 1).  Along with knowing local and regional 
history or language, the ability to anticipate how individuals will respond in the context 
of their values, norms, and society can help shape communication (Abu-Nimer, 1996) 
and should improve the chances of obtaining cooperation.  
Cultural training.  Despite the military’s statements about the importance of 
cultural competence, overall, cultural training to increase soldiers’ ability to live and 
perform in culturally diverse environments is not widespread.  Prior to operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the military has spent most of its time “honing its lethal capabilities” 
which has left it “lacking the knowledge, skills, and trained personnel to shape the 
operational environment with non-lethal means such as information operations” (Rogers, 
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2005, p. iii).  Developing and integrating this non-lethal, cultural training is an ongoing 
process.   
The emphasis and intensity of cultural training varies throughout the military.  
Only specific career fields, such as Special Forces, Foreign Area Officers, Civil Affairs, 
Military Information Support, and attachés, emphasize cultural competence (Hajjar, 
2010; Lewis, 2006).  While these specialties’ missions focus specifically on cross-
cultural interaction, all deployed soldiers may encounter these situations while deployed.  
The training most soldiers receive varies based on location of deployment, availability of 
training material, emphasis by commanders, and time restraints prior to deployment, 
some as little as two to four hours, and most often only resulting in a “tourist level” of 
cultural competence (Lewis, 2006, p. 3; Troop, 2006).   
 One Department of Defense funded study on cultural competence attempted to 
identify general psychological variables of military cross-cultural influence, as well as 
environmental features specific to military mission performance (Ross, 2008).  Interview 
data from nine Army officer and enlisted males revealed empathy (understanding other 
peoples’ feelings), interpersonal skills (attitude and communication skills), mental 
models (perspective taking), and willingness to engage/openness to experience were 
important for mission success in cross-cultural, deployed interactions.   
 My research expands on the findings of the Ross 2008 interviews of the nine male 
Army personnel to look at a much larger sample of men and women from multiple 
services.  .  It also examines specific mission or task success in the form of influence 
attempts.  The study is meant to be part of the “next generation of social influence 
research” (Crano & Prislin, 2006, p. 354). 
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Current Study 
 The goal of the current study is to apply both influence and cross-cultural research 
to the context of soldiers interacting with culturally different populations while deployed.  
Specifically, I am interested in exploring whether influence technique choice and aspects 
of culture (including cultural training) contribute to the relative success of influence 
attempts in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
Research Questions  
1. Does cultural training predict ratings of influence success?   
2. Do any other cultural variables predict the perceived success of influence attempts?    
3. Does the choice of influence technique predict the perceived success of influence 
attempts?  
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
 
Participants 
Criterion for participation in the survey included U.S. military service, 
deployment experience to Iraq and/or Afghanistan, and multiple face to face interactions 
with host country civilians.  Participants were recruited through postings on social 
networking websites, emails to known military member contacts, write ups in military 
journals, and flyers.  Additionally, National Guard members in Oregon and Colorado 
were offered a $200 donation to each of their Emergency Relief Funds if 50 qualified 
National Guard members from their respective states completed the survey.  
There were 253 individuals who started the survey, 228 of which qualified for 
participation by having face to face interactions with civilians while deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  Of qualified participants, 119 (52%) completed the survey, and 109 (48%) 
completed part of the survey and were included in some analyses.   
For the 228 qualified participants, there were 187 males (82%) and 32 females.  
Seventy-four percent (169) served in the Army, along with 39 Air Force, 13 Marines, 7 
Navy military members.  There were 95 National Guard members, 92 Active Duty, 29 
Reservists.  Deployment experience history included 136 members deployed to Iraq, 53 
deployed to Afghanistan, and 39 with deployment experience to both Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   For all influence attempts, 95% (337 of 356) were made during or after 
2001, with only six occurring during 2000 or earlier and 13 responses of I don’t 
know/classified.  
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Design 
Data were collected using an anonymous online survey.  Participants were current 
and former military members with deployment experience to Iraq, Afghanistan, or both 
for past or current operations.  They were recruited using flyers, email, social networking 
websites (such as Facebook), and social networking.  
 There were two sets of questions in the survey, demographic questions and 
questions related to two separate influence attempts.  Participants were instructed not to 
provide classified information, and an ‘I don’t know/classified’ response was included for 
each content question.   
During the survey, participants were instructed at the beginning of each influence 
section, that 
we are interested in your interactions with civilians while deployed.  In particular, 
we are interested in situations in which you tried to influence the attitudes, 
behaviors, or beliefs of [Iraqi or Afghani] civilians.  For example, you may have 
tried to increase reporting of suspicious behavior to local authorities, promote 
positive attitudes toward US soldiers, or decrease the frequency of children 
throwing stones at soldiers.  Think of the time you were most successful in 
influencing one or more [Iraqi or Afghani] civilians. 
 They were asked to think of two influence attempts, one generally successful and 
one generally less successful for Iraq, Afghanistan, or both depending on deployment 
experience.  For individuals deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan, the order of country 
questions, Iraq and Afghanistan, was counterbalanced.  Hence those deployed to one 
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country reported on two influence attempts; those deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan 
reported on four influence attempts.   
Measures 
Questions were asked about language skills, cultural knowledge and training, 
empathy and respect toward cultural differences, and time spent in country.  Many of 
these are extensions of the cross-cultural competence factors found in Ross’s (2008) 
interview data from deployed soldiers.  Individuals rated themselves on empathy, 
language ability and cultural knowledge, respect (openness), and prior relationships 
(experience).   
Influence techniques from Marwell and Schmitt’s (1967) study were used to 
assess ways in which soldiers attempted to influence attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of 
civilians. The wording used for the 16 influence techniques developed was updated in 
places for easier comprehension, and each was followed by a description (Table 1).  
Participants were asked to identify which techniques were used for each influence 
attempt.  Additionally, they were asked to identify which techniques they had ever used 
in each country, Iraq or Afghanistan.  To assess the relative successfulness of influence 
attempts and techniques, participants rated each influence attempt on a scale from 1 (not 
at all successful) to 10 (extremely successful).    Participants deployed to only Iraq or 
Afghanistan had two ratings of success, one for the relatively successful attempt and one 
for the relatively unsuccessful attempt.  Participants deployed to both countries reported 
on four influence attempts and thus made four ratings of success. With gaps in the 
overlap between cross-cultural and influence bodies of literature, there was no existing 
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survey which covered cross-cultural influence attempts of deployed soldiers. Therefore, 
data collection was divided into two rounds.   
Table 1. 
 
16 Influence Techniques and Descriptions  
Technique Description 
Reward If you comply, I will reward you 
Punishment If you don’t comply, I will punish you 
Debt You owe me compliance because of past favors 
Gift Give gift, then make request 
Liking Be nice so target will want to comply with your request 
Pleading I need your compliance very badly, so please do it for me 
Aversive Stimulation Punish until they comply with your request 
Moral Appeal You are immoral if you do not comply 
Positive Self-feeling You will feel better about yourself if you comply 
Negative Self-feeling You will feel worse about yourself if you do not comply 
Positive Expertise If you comply, good things will happen to you 
Negative Expertise If you don’t comply, bad things will happen to you 
Positive Traits A good person would comply 
Negative Traits A bad person would not comply 
Positive Esteem People you care about will think better of you if you comply 
Negative Esteem People you care about will think worse of you if you do not 
comply 
 
The first round had open ended and multiple choice questions about cross-cultural 
influence attempts (see Appendix B).  These responses were used to establish a baseline 
of potential scenarios for cross-cultural influence attempts in deployed environments 
because these categories could not be developed solely on existing literature.  This 
information was used to create multiple choice categories for the round two survey.  
There were six main questions that response sets were created for:  
1. What attitude/belief were you trying to change?  
2. What behavior were you trying to change?  
3. For this influence attempts, check all techniques/approaches you used:  
16 
 
4. What evidence helped you evaluate how successful your influence attempt 
was?  
5. What aspects of the situation were favorable and/or unfavorable to your 
influence attempt?  
6. What cultural factors played an important role in your influence attempt?  
The round two survey contained only multiple choice questions to help increase 
the completion rate by decreasing the amount of time needed to complete the survey (see 
Appendix C).  To increase participation, the National Guard donation incentive was used 
during the second round of data collection.  Army National Guard units in both Colorado 
and Oregon were contacted to participate in the survey and instructed that $200 would be 
donated to their Emergency Relief Fund from the Groups and War Lab at the University 
of Oregon if 50 qualified National Guard members from their respective states completed 
the survey, or $100 if at least 25 qualified participants completed the survey.  These 
changes helped increased both participation and completion rate from 38% (41 of 107) in 
round one to 65% (78 of 121) in round two. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
 
Predicting Success and Failure 
In this study, we examined which variables and technique choices may contribute 
to the relative success or failure of influence attempts of deployed soldiers. Multiple 
regressions were run to examine the impact of 14 variables on the perceived success of  
influence attempts (10 point Likert-scale). Predictors included soldier demographics 
(gender, age at deployment), training types (cultural, civil affairs, military information 
support operations/MISO, and special forces), influence target (friendliness towards 
troops, individual or group, familiarity, and prior relationships), general cultural variables 
(empathy, respect, understanding local culture), and total time in country.  
The number of participants for each analysis varies.  For some analyses, there are 
a smaller number of participants’ responses examined because of missing data, as well as 
analyses specifically designed to look at only round 2 data.  Additionally, for some tests, 
data provided from individuals deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan are counted twice 
to account for their experiences in each country.  
Participant ratings of influence attempt success were gathered for both successful 
and unsuccessful attempts.    The mean success rating on a scale from 1 (not at all 
successful) to 10 (extremely successful) was 6.47 (SD = 1.99) for the relatively 
successful attempts, and 3.99 (SD = 2.01) for the relatively unsuccessful attempts.  A 
paired samples t-test showed a significant difference in mean ratings of successful and 
unsuccessful influence attempts (t [131] = 11.15, p < .001).  
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Two regressions were run to determine if deployment experience was correlated 
with ratings of success for either successful or unsuccessful influence attempts.  Country 
of deployment, Iraq, Afghanistan, or both, did not significantly predict ratings of success 
for successful (F (1,161) = .50, p = .48) or unsuccessful (F (1,130) = .01, p = .94) 
attempts.  Thus, influence attempts across all deployment experiences were combined.  
 Separate regressions were run for successful and unsuccessful influence attempts 
using the variables listed in the first paragraph as predictors.  Because two influence 
attempts were discussed, the characteristics of these situations (e.g., target of influence, 
familiarity, and time in country) may vary between the attempts.  Empathy and respect 
were strongly correlated with success ratings for both sets of influence attempts, the 
relatively successful (r = .61, p < .001) and relatively unsuccessful (r = .71, p < .001) 
attempts (Table A1).   
In order to simplify the final interpretation of the variables and resolve issues of 
multicollinearity, empathy and respect were averaged and a new variable was created. 
A reduced model of regression which included the average between reported 
empathy and respect (β = .39, p < .001), and familiarity (β = .24, p = .01) significantly 
predicted influence attempt success ratings for the relatively successful attempts (F(2, 
106) = 14.21, p < .001; Table A2).  As empathy/respect, and familiarity increase, 
successfulness of influence attempt ratings also increase.  Inclusion of the other variables 
failed to explain a significantly greater amount of variance beyond the reduced model 
(∆R2 = .07, p = .66).   
A regression for the relatively unsuccessful influence attempt ratings produced a 
reduced model of empathy/ respect (β = .26, p = .02) and prior relationships (β = .25, p = 
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.02), which significantly predicted unsuccessful influence attempt success ratings (F(2, 
79) = 5.89, p = .004).  As the average of empathy and respect and ratings of prior 
relationships increase, ratings of relative success increased (Table A2).   
As with the first regression, adding the remaining variables failed to improve on 
the reduced model (∆R2 = .07, p = .89).  Because the combined empathy and respect 
variable was substantially correlated with prior relationships (r = .53, p < .001) and 
understanding local culture (r = .70, p < .001), residuals were used for the variables of 
prior relationships and understanding local culture in order to simply the final 
interpretation of the factors and resolve issues of multicollinearity (Table A1).  
Influence Technique Clusters 
A factor analysis was performed on the 16 influence techniques reportedly ever 
used in Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to define groupings.  Using principal component 
analysis and an oblique promax rotation on the 16 influence techniques resulted in five 
factors which explained 61.62% of the variance in the model.  The other/none of the 
above/classified option was excluded for three reasons. It was rarely used, by nature 
difficult to interpret, and including this option tended to split some of the influence 
techniques among factors.  Figure A1 shows the frequency of technique choices ever 
used in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The five clusters that emerged were negative techniques (negative traits, moral 
appeal, negative esteem, negative expertise), power differential techniques (aversive 
stimulation, pleading, punishment, negative self-feeling), positive traits (positive 
expertise, positive traits), resource techniques (gift, reward, liking, debt), and positive 
feeling (positive esteem, positive self-feeling).  Table 2 shows these factor groupings, and 
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following Gorsuch’s (1983) guidelines, scores below .30 were excluded.  Techniques in 
all five factors loaded at .40 or above.  Of the 16 items, three are potentially problematic 
due to loading on a secondary factor with less than .10 difference from its main factor.  
Negative expertise in the negative factor also moderately loads on positive traits, negative 
self-feeling in the power differential factor also moderately loads on the negative factor, 
and debt in the resources factor also moderately loads on the negative factor (Table 2).  
Table 3 shows the correlation between factors.  There were three pairs with 
correlations higher than .35; factors three and four (r = .36), factors one and five (r = 
.36), factors one and two (r = .35).  Two factor pairs, three and five (r = .04) and four and 
five (r = .03), have correlations less than .05.   
Table 2.   
 
Factor Loadings: for Promax Rotation for 16 Influence Techniques Ever Used 
 Factors 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Negative Traits .915     
Moral Appeal .678     
Negative Esteem .473  .325   
Negative Expertise .434 .391    
Aversive Stimulation  .797    
Pleading  .670    
Punishment  .621 .342  -.426 
Negative Self-feeling .352 .435    
Positive Expertise   .903   
Positive Traits .366  .634   
Gift    .867  
Reward   .314 .567  
Liking    .545  
Debt .344   .379  
Positive Esteem     .843 
Positive Self-feeling   .303  .687 
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Table 3.   
 
Correlation Matrix for Influence Technique Clusters Ever Used in Iraq and Afghanistan  
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
1 - .350 .326 .249 .356 
2  - .269 .265 .207 
3   - .357 .036 
4    - .032 
5     - 
Note. Repeated correlation values excluded 
Technique Clusters and Ratings of Success 
The technique clusters defined by the factor analysis groupings of techniques ever 
used was applied to the techniques specifically used in successful and unsuccessful 
influence attempts.  An average factor score was computed for each of the five factors 
based on the number of items endorsed divided by the total possible number of 
techniques for each factor.  This calculation was completed for both successful and 
unsuccessful influence attempts, resulting in five cluster scores for each influence type.  
These factor cluster scores were used to determine relationships between factor type and 
successfulness.  
To examine this relationship, cluster average scores were also used in two 
regressions for ratings of success in relatively successful and relatively unsuccessful 
influence attempts.  None of the five factors were significant predictors of variance in 
ratings of success for successful (F(5, 99)= 1.137, p = . 346) or unsuccessful influence 
attempts (F(5, 77) = .551, p = .737).  It is important to note, however, that because ratings 
of success were only collected for extreme ends, successful and unsuccessful, and not the 
entire spectrum of influence attempts, it is difficult to assume a similar relationship for 
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moderately successful influence attempts.  Thus, a regression may not offer a complete 
explanation of relationships in this data.   
Looking into these relationships further, a repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted for each factor cluster to assess differences in frequency of use between 
successful and unsuccessful influence attempts.  The first factor cluster (negative 
techniques) was used significantly more in unsuccessful influence attempts than in 
successful attempts (F(1,86) = 19.43, p < .001) (Figure 1).  This was also true for power 
differential techniques (F(1,86) = 16.34, p < .001).  In contrast resources (F(1,86) = 6.46, 
p = .01), and positive feelings (F(1,86) = 1.75, p = .19) clusters were used significantly 
more often in successful attempts than in  unsuccessful attempts. The only cluster that did 
not differ significantly in usage was positive traits (F(1,86) = 3.56, p = .06) (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Influence Technique Cluster Use for Successful and Unsuccessful Influence 
Attempts  
Note. *Significant differences at the p < .05 level 
* 
* 
Technique Clusters 
     Negative 
     Power Differential  
     Positive Traits 
     Resources  
     Positive Feeling 
 
* 
* 
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Next, I wanted to examine if these differences in technique use between 
successful and unsuccessful attempts could be seen within each type of attempt.  Ratings 
of success during influence attempts were divided into unsuccessful (ratings one to five) 
and successful (ratings of six to 10) for both attempt types. 
For successful influence attempts, a 2 x 5 ANOVA of successful technique 
clusters and coded successfulness category revealed that positive feelings (F(1,103) = 
7.45, p = .01), significantly differed between more successful (6 to 10) and less 
successful (1 to 5) ratings (Table A3). Figure 2 shows that for successful attempts rated 
six or above, techniques in the positive feeling cluster were used more than for 
techniques rated five or below.  The other factors, negative traits (F(1,103) = .02, p = 
.88), power differential (F(1,103) = .07, p = .79), positive traits (F(1,103) = .20, p = .66), 
and resources (F(1,103) = 0.0, p = .99) did not differ significantly between the two 
categories.   
 
Figure 2.  Technique Clusters for Successful Influence Attempts 
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For unsuccessful influence attempts, a 2x5 ANOVA of successful technique 
clusters and coded successfulness revealed the resource factor (F(1,81) = 4.80, p = .03), 
significantly differed between successful (6 to 10) and unsuccessful (1 to 5) ratings 
(Table A5).  Figure 3 shows that in unsuccessful attempts rated five or below, techniques 
in the resource cluster were used less often than those rated six or above. The other 
factors, negative traits (F(1,81) = 1.75, p = .19), power differential (F(1,81) = .36, p = 
.55), positive traits (F(1,81) = .001, p = .98), and positive feelings (F(1,81) = 2.40, p = 
.13) clusters did not differ significantly.  Although use of techniques in the positive 
feelings cluster did not differ significantly between successful and unsuccessful ratings 
for relatively less successful influence attempts, a similar trend was found to successful 
influence attempts with less reported use in unsuccessful influence attempts and 
increased use in successful attempts.   
 
Figure 3.  Technique Clusters for Unsuccessful Influence Attempts  
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping 
behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.   
Robert M. Gates (2007) 
 
Predictors of Success and Failure 
Among the measured variables, only empathy/respect, familiarity, and prior 
relationships significantly predicted the rated success of influence attempts.  The 
averaged empathy/respect variable significantly predicted success ratings in both 
relatively successful and relatively unsuccessful attempts.  Familiarity significantly 
predicted success ratings only with reportedly successful influence attempts, and prior 
relationships predicted relative success only with reportedly unsuccessful attempts.   
These results support Ross’s (2008) findings from military member interviews 
describing cross-cultural situations.  Ross (2008) found interpersonal skills, including 
rapport building, empathy, perspective taking, and openness to experience as critical 
elements of cross-cultural competence, with perspective taking being the most important 
factor.   
Ross’s elements can be combined into two variables, relationship building 
(interpersonal skills and openness to experience) and general personality traits (empathy 
and perspective taking), and compared to combined significant factors of relationship 
building (prior relationship and familiarity) and general personality traits (empathy and 
respect).  Using these combined variables, general personality traits emerge in both 
studies as the most vital element of cross-cultural interactions, significant for both 
successful and unsuccessful influence attempts, and most commonly mentioned in 
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interviews (Ross, 2008).  Additionally, elements of relationship building were found to 
be the second most important aspect in cross-cultural competence (Ross, 2008), as well 
as the only significant factors other than empathy and respect as correlated to ratings of 
influence success.  
Influence Techniques  
 The five influence technique clusters that emerged, negative techniques (negative 
traits, moral appeal, negative esteem, negative expertise), power differential techniques 
(aversive stimulation, pleading, punishment, negative self-feeling), positive traits 
(positive expertise, positive traits), resource techniques (gift, reward, liking, debt), and 
positive feeling (positive esteem, positive self-feeling) fit into conceptually logical 
categories.  These categories, however, are different from Marwell and Schmitt’s (1967) 
original grouping.  They found clusters of rewarding activity (gift, liking, reward), 
punishing activity (punishment, aversive stimulation), expertise (positive and negative 
expertise), activation of impersonal commitment (positive and negative self-feeling, 
positive and negative traits, positive and negative esteem, moral appeal), and activation 
of personal commitments (pleading, negative esteem, debt, negative traits).  
 These differences in technique clustering may be linked to two variations in data 
collection: influence scenarios and likelihood of use.  First, the scenarios for assessing 
likelihood of technique use in Marwell and Schmitt’s (1967) study were provided  by the 
researchers and only have four different types of relationships; supervisor/employee, 
parent/child, college roommates, and a door-to-door salesman/potential customer.  In 
three of the four scenarios, all except the door-to-door salesmen, a fairly high degree of 
similarity and familiarity can be assumed.  Supervisor and employees embody the same 
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values and ideals of the company they work for and have a high degree of interaction.  
Parents raise children to mirror their values and see each other daily.  College roommates 
are both pursuing higher education and also see each other frequently.  The only situation 
in which there is likely a low degree of similarity and familiarity is a door-to-door 
salesman and a potential customer.  Additionally, culture is not addressed in this study.  
 The second reason for differences in technique clustering may come from 
assessment of technique use.  Marwell and Schmitt (1967) ask participants about 
likelihood of technique use in future interactions, while this study asked for techniques 
already used.  Prediction of future behavior, used in Marwell and Schmitt’s study is 
similar to the theory of planned behavior, which postulates that certain motivational 
factors lead to intention which in turn leads to behavior choice (Ajzen, 1991).  While this 
theory has merit, past behavior has been shown to be a better predictor of future behavior 
(Wong & Mullen, 2009).  Thus, this study presumably represents a more likely set of 
behavior clusters.   
Limitations and Future Research 
 Although past behavior is a more reliable predictor of future behavior than 
intentions, a retrospective study of events, some of which happened 10 years ago, may 
still be problematic.  Influence attempts should be studied shortly after they are made, 
during debriefing sessions when troops return to base after a mission, for the most 
reliable reporting.   
 Another limitation of this study is the use of single item measures for some of the 
variables potentially contributing to influence attempt success.  Because there are so 
many aspects of a situation which may impact influence success, but so little literature on 
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influence attempts of deployed soldiers, a wide range of variables were assessed at a 
superficial level.  This framework can shape future research questions about military 
influence attempts. 
 One final shortcoming to note is the type of influence attempt delivery assessed.  
Only face to face influence was examined, but there are many other mediums available 
for exerting influence.  Written posters, television commercials, or a combination of 
influence types may be combined.  
Military Application of Results 
In predicting ratings of influence success, of notable importance is the lack of 
impact of cultural, civil affairs, MISO, and special forces training.  It is important to note 
that while these types of training did not predict the success of influence attempts in this 
study, they are clearly important to military operations.  The focus of cultural, civil 
affairs, and special forces training is not influence, and most likely not tailored to 
teaching cross-cultural communication and influence skills. However, if this training is 
expected to produce culturally competent soldiers skilled at influencing civilians, aspects 
of training may need to be modified to address or improve these skills. 
For soldiers trained in any area, it is important to have the training and skills to 
successfully manage cross-cultural situations.  Even when these situations are not central 
to a career field, the  situations soldiers face while deployed are dynamic, and soldiers 
must understand how and when to use both lethal and non-lethal tools (Daniel, 2010).  
Developing ‘non-lethal’ military capabilities (Rogers, 2005, p. iii) involves not only 
providing training, but ensuring that training is effective.  
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Military Information Support Operations (MISO) 
However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.  
attributed to Winston Churchill 
 
The objective of MISO is to change the behavior of specific foreign populations 
in order to support mission objectives.  However, this type of training was not 
significantly correlated with ratings of influence attempt success. This may be due in part 
to differences in culture or the specific type of influence assessed in this study, face to 
face.  
The lack of significance may also be linked to a deficit in feedback for these types 
of influence operations.  The goal of MISO to influence a specific change in behavior, 
however, assessing the effectiveness of influence attempts is challenging because of the 
difficulties in both assessing changes in behavior and attributing these changes to MISO.  
The “ability to predict, recognize, and measure” the effects of MISO “in some 
meaningful way and provide convincing evidence that [MSIO] caused effects, or these 
were significantly influenced by non-kinetic [MISO] actions” is one of the biggest 
challenges of MISO (Perry, 2008, p. 9).  Understanding what types of influence attempts 
work, and which ones don’t, is essential to duplicate positive results and avoid 
unsuccessful ones (Perry, 2008).   
 Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of civilian populations is often one of many 
military missions, which is lead by MISO and performed by troops at the tactical level.  
This type of operation is crucial because of its non-kinetic approach; it minimizes 
violence and potential loss of human life as a means of mission success. However, MISO 
has been criticized because of its lack of measures of effectiveness (MOE), discredited, 
and thus underutilized by commanders (Perry, 2008).  A lack of resources when planning 
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and in assessment (Perry, 2008) and the nature of the military operations make MOE 
difficult to determine.  The availability of intelligence information, manpower, and time 
are often scarce.  Additionally, the nature of non-kinetic operations means effects are not 
always immediate and obvious, such as when dropping a bomb. MISO operations require 
equal resources both to influence as well as to assess effectiveness, however, once the 
effect is produced, it is essential to follow up with well designed MOE.   
Conclusion  
 This study attempted to link multiple branches of research; influence, cross-
cultural, and military.  Future research should continue to study influence and culture in 
military operations.  This environment is not only unique, but advances in research which 
benefit soldiers can also potentially save lives.  Furthermore, in studying influence 
attempts, different types of message delivery beyond just face to face need to be studied.  
Interpretation and commitment to influence attempts with different message delivery, 
such as a radio commercial or poster, may greatly impact success.   Finally, since 
influence is not necessarily comprised of a single attempt, but many interactions and 
techniques, it needs to be studied throughout the process to better assess situational 
factors contributing to the successfulness of attempts for each interactions.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table A1. 
 
Correlation table for Empathy, Respect, Prior Relationships, and Understanding Local 
Culture for Successful and Unsuccessful influence attempts in Iraq and Afghanistan  
 Empathy  Respect Relationships Culture 
Empathy 
Successful 
Unsuccessful 
 
- 
 
.608** 
.710** 
 
.351** 
.463** 
 
.539** 
.631** 
Respect 
Successful 
Unsuccessful 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
.344** 
.528** 
 
.595** 
.683** 
Relationships 
Successful 
Unsuccessful 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
.497** 
.550** 
Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Table A2. 
 
Regression Table for Successful and Unsuccessful Influence Attempts 
 B Std. Error β Sig 
Successful  
Empathy/Respect 
Familiarity  
.40 
.39 
.09 
.14 
.39 
.24 
.00 
.01 
Unsuccessful 
Empathy 
Prior Relationships  
.21 
.19 
.09 
.08 
.26 
.25 
.02 
.02 
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Table A3. 
 
Mean frequencies of Influence Tactic Use for Successful and Unsuccessful Influence 
Attempts for Low (1-5) and High (6-10) Ratings  
 N Negative  Power 
Difference 
Positive 
Traits 
Resources Positive 
Feelings 
Successful 
Low (1-5) 
High (6-10) 
All 
33 
72 
105 
.03 (.08) 
.03 (.08) 
.03 (.08) 
.05 (.17) 
.05 (.19) 
.05 (.18) 
.24 (.38) 
.28 (.37) 
.27 (.37) 
.26 (.25) 
.26 (.26) 
.26 (.25) 
.14 (.29)* 
.38 (.04)* 
.27 (.35) 
Unsuccessful 
Low (1-5) 
High (6-10) 
All 
63 
20 
87 
.11 (.18) 
.05 (.10) 
.09 (17) 
.13 (.21) 
.10 (15) 
.12 (.20) 
.22 (.36) 
.23 (.38) 
.21 (.35) 
.24 (.27)* 
.10 (.17)* 
.20 (.26) 
.14 (.32) 
.28 (.38) 
.17 (.33) 
Note. *Significant difference at the p < .05 level, standard deviation in parenthesis  
 
 
Table A4. 
 
ANOVA for Successful Factor Clusters 
 Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Negative Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.000 
.664 
.664 
1 
103 
104 
.000 
.006 
.022 .881 
Power 
Difference 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.001 
1.424 
1.425 
1 
103 
104 
.001 
.014 
.072 .789 
Positive 
Traits 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.028 
14.505 
14.533 
1 
103 
104 
.028 
.141 
.201 .655 
Resources  Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.000 
6.557 
6.557 
1 
103 
104 
.000 
.064 
.000 .991 
Positive 
Feelings 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.878 
12.136 
13.014 
1 
103 
104 
.878 
.118 
7.451 .007 
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Table A5. 
 
ANOVA for Unsuccessful Factor Clusters 
 Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Negative Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.050 
2.289 
2.339 
1 
81 
82 
.050 
.028 
1.754 .189 
Power 
Difference 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.015 
3.282 
3.297 
1 
81 
82 
.015 
.041 
.359 .551 
Positive 
Traits 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.000 
10.626 
10.627 
1 
81 
82 
.000 
.131 
.001 .976 
Resources  Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.306 
5.171 
5.477 
1 
81 
82 
.306 
.064 
4.799 .031 
Positive 
Feelings 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.265 
8.952 
9.217 
1 
81 
82 
.265 
.111 
2.399 .125 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1.  Average Use of Influence Tactics Ever Used in Iraq and Afghanistan  
Technique Clusters 
     Negative 
     Power Differential  
     Positive Traits 
     Resources  
     Positive Feeling 
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APPENDIX B 
 
EXAMPLE OF ROUND ONE OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL  
 
INFLUENCE ATTEMPTS 
 
Q1 What attitude/belief were you trying to change? 
Q2 What behavior were you trying to change? 
Q3 Please describe what you did during this influence attempt.  Describe the details of 
the setting and include any details you think were relevant, BUT DO NOT INCLUDE 
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. 
Q4 What evidence made you think your influence attempt was successful? 
Q5 What aspects of the situation (political announcements, needs of the population, 
cultural knowledge, etc), of your actions, or recent events contributed to the success of 
the influence attempt?  
Q6 What aspects of the situation, your actions, or other recent events made the influence 
attempt difficult or less successful? 
Q7 What aspects of the local culture played the most important role in your influence 
attempt? 
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APPENDIX C 
 
EXAMPLE OF ROUND TWO QUESTION SET FOR SUCCESSFUL  
 
INFLUENCE ATTEMPTS IN IRAQ  
 
Q1   Share your military expertise!   Please take this survey if:      
1.    You have deployed to Iraq and/or Afghanistan AND      
2.    During your deployment you had multiple face-to-face interactions with civilians   
The purpose of the project is to extract lessons learned for cultural deployment training 
and influence attempts abroad.      
This survey is for Capt Andrea Wolfe’s Masters thesis research with the Psychology of 
War lab at the University of Oregon.  It should take most people between 15 and 25 
minutes to complete depending on whether they deployed to one country or both      
Researchers: Andrea Wolfe, Capt, USAF & Dr. Holly Arrow, Department of Psychology, 
University of Oregon.  
Contact awolfe3[at]uoregon.edu & harrow [at]uoregon.edu (replace “at” with @)        
 Yes, continue (1) 
 No, I do not want to take the survey at this time (2) 
Q2   You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Capt Andrea Wolfe 
under the supervision of Dr. Holly Arrow, from the University of Oregon, Department of 
Psychology. The goal of the present study is to investigate the experience of US military 
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thank you for helping us with our research.        
If you decide to participate, you will be completing a questionnaire online. It should take 
most people about 15-25 minutes. Your participation can aid us in understanding US 
soldier’s experience with influence attempts in Iraq and Afghanistan and can potentially 
lead to a better understanding of how group dynamics affect the performance and 
satisfaction of members.        
Your participation is voluntary and all data collected in this experiment will be 
anonymous, both to researchers and your chain of command, and will provide no way of 
identifying you or your computer.  You are free to stop answering the questions and quit 
at any time.  
If you have any questions, feel free to contact Capt Andrea Wolfe at 
awolfe3@uoregon.edu.  
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact the Office for 
Protection of Human Subjects, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR  97403, (541) 346-
2510. The views expressed in this survey are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the 
U.S. Government. 
 Yes, start the survey (1) 
 No, I do not want to take the survey at this time (2) 
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Q3   Have you deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and attempted to influence (either 
formally or informally) the attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors of the local population? 
 Iraq only (1) 
 Afghanistan only (2) 
 Iraq and Afghanistan (3) 
 No deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan (5) 
 I did not have face to face contact with local populations while deployed (4) 
Q4 What is/was your branch of service? 
 Army (1) 
 Marines (2) 
 Navy (3) 
 Air Force (4) 
Q5 Provide your primary military specialty code for your most recent deployment. 
 MOS (1) ____________________ 
Q6 During your most recent deployment, were you in the National Guard, Reserves, or 
Active Duty? 
 National Guard (1) 
 Reserves (2) 
 Active Duty (3) 
Q7 If you have ever served in the National Guard, which state?  __________________ 
 
Q8 During your most recent deployment, what was your rank? __________________ 
 
Q9 Gender 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
Q10 Age 
 18 - 24 (1) 
 25 - 29 (2) 
 30 - 34 (3) 
 35 - 39 (4) 
 40 - 44 (5) 
 45 or older (6)  
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Q11 Have you received training in any of the following areas? (select all that apply) 
 Psychological Operations (PSYOP) (1) 
 Civil Affairs (CA) (2) 
 Special Forces (3) 
 None of the above (4) 
Q12 Have you received any cultural training such as cross-cultural communication 
training, cultural negotiations training, cultural briefings, etc? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Q13 Was the cultural training aimed at: 
 Iraq (1) 
 Afghanistan (2) 
 Iraq and Afghanistan (3) 
 South Asia or Middle Eastern regions (4) 
 Other region (5) 
 General cultural training (6) 
Q14 Briefly describe the cultural training(s) you received. 
 
Q15 Next, we are interesting in your interactions with civilians while deployed.  In 
particular, we are interested in situations in which you tried to influence the attitudes, 
behaviors, or beliefs of Iraqi civilians.  For example, you may have tried to increase 
reporting of suspicious behavior to local authorities, promote positive attitudes toward 
US soldiers, or decrease the frequency of children throwing stones at soldiers.    Think of 
the time you were most successful in influencing one or more Iraqi civilians.  Select the 
province in which this occurred: 
 I don't know/classified 
(1) 
 Al-Anbar (2) 
 Al-Basrah (3) 
 Al-Muthanna (4) 
 Al-Qadisiyah (5) 
 An-Najaf (6) 
 Arbil (7) 
 As-Sulaymaniyah (8) 
 At-Ta'mim (9) 
 Babil (10) 
 Baghdad (11) 
 Dahuk (12) 
 Dhi Qar (13) 
 Karbala' (14) 
 Maysan (15) 
 Ninawa (16) 
 Salah ad-Din (17) 
 Wasit (18) 
 
Q16 Did the influence attempt take place in an urban or rural setting? 
 I don't know/classified (1) 
 Urban (2) 
 Rural (3) 
Q17 What year did the influence attempt take place? 
38 
 
 I don't know/classified 
(23) 
 Before 1990 (1) 
 1990 (2) 
 1991 (3) 
 1992 (4) 
 1993 (5) 
 1994 (6) 
 1995 (7) 
 1996 (8) 
 1997 (9) 
 1998 (10) 
 1999 (11) 
 2000 (12) 
 2001 (13) 
 2002 (14) 
 2003 (15) 
 2004 (16) 
 2005 (17) 
 2006 (18) 
 2007 (19) 
 2008 (20) 
 2009 (21) 
 2010 (22) 
 
Q18 What month did the influence attempt take place? 
 January - March (1) 
 April - June (2) 
 July - September (3) 
 October - December (4) 
Q19 How much total time had you spent in Iraq at the time of the influence attempt? 
______ Years (1) 
______ Months (2) 
Q20 How friendly or hostile were Iraqi civilians at the time of the influence attempt? 
 Very friendly toward US soldiers (1) 
 Somewhat friendly toward US soldiers (2) 
 Mixed or neutral toward US soldiers (3) 
 Somewhat hostile toward US soldiers (4) 
 Very hostile toward US soldiers (5) 
Q21 Who were you trying to influence? 
 Single individual (1) 
 Multiple individuals (2) 
 Particular group (3) 
 General population (4) 
Q22 Did the individual have a leadership role, and if so, what was it? 
 No (1) 
 Yes (2) ____________________ 
Q23 What was the gender of the individual you were trying to influence? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
Q24 What ethnic group(s) did the individual belong to (check all that apply)? 
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 I don't know/classified (1) 
 Sunni (2) 
 Shi'a (3) 
 Kurd (4) 
 Other (5) 
Q25 How familiar were you with the individual you were trying to influence? 
 Not at all familiar (1) 
 Slightly familiar (2) 
 Somewhat familiar (3) 
 Moderately familiar (4) 
 Extremely familiar (5) 
Q26 What was the age of the individual you were trying to influence? 
 18 and under (1) 
 19 - 29 (2) 
 30 - 39 (3) 
 40 - 49 (4) 
 50 and older (5) 
 I don't know (6) 
Q27 What was the native language of the individual you were trying to influence? 
 Arabic (1) 
 Kurdish (2) 
 Turkish (3) 
 I don't know / Other (4) 
Q28 How proficient in this language were you at the time of the influence attempt? 
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 1. No ability whatsoever in the language (1) 
 2. Able to operate in only a very limited capacity (2) 
 3. Able to satisfy immediate needs (3) 
 4. Able to satisfy most survival needs, minimum courtesy requirements, and limited 
social demands (4) 
 5. Able to satisfy most survival needs and limited work requirements (5) 
 6. Able to satisfy routine social demands and limited work requirements (6) 
 7. Able to satisfy most work requirements (7) 
 8. Able to speak the language accurately and participate effectively in most 
conversations (8) 
 9. Able to speak with a great deal of fluency, grammatical accuracy, precision of 
vocabulary (9) 
 10. Able to speak like an educated native speaker (10) 
 Not applicable (11) 
Q29 Did you use a translator to communicate? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Q30 The primary focus of the influence attempt was: 
 Attitudes / beliefs (1) 
 Behaviors (2) 
 Both attitudes/beliefs and behaviors (3) 
Q31 MOST SUCCESSFUL INFLUENCE: Iraq  What attitude/belief were you trying to 
change? 
 Positive/negative attitude toward US troops/United States in general (1) 
 US government/troops are there to help versus invaders who will never leave (2) 
 Effectiveness/trustworthiness of Iraqi government/leaders/police (3) 
 Attitudes toward other tribes/communities in Iraq (4) 
 Belief in the future/potential of Iraq (5) 
 Attitudes toward women, including US and local women, education of girls, etc (6) 
 Belief in Al-Qaeda statements/propaganda (7) 
 Attitudes/beliefs concerning specific practical issues in the community such as 
building infrastructure, local priorities, etc (8) 
 Other/none of the above/classified (9) 
Q32 What behavior were you trying to change? 
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 Cooperation with/support of US forces (1) 
 Cooperation with/support of Iraqi authorities/government (2) 
 Voting in elections (3) 
 Rioting/looting/fighting with other people/groups (4) 
 Supporting Taliban/insurgents (5) 
 Reporting IEDs, suspicious activity, sharing useful information, etc (6) 
 Other/none of the above/classified (7) 
Q33 For this successful influence attempt, check all techniques/approaches you used: 
 Reward:  If you comply, I will reward you (1) 
 Punishment: If you don’t comply, I will punish you (2) 
 Debt: You owe me compliance because of past favors (7) 
 Gift: Give gift, then make request (6) 
 Liking:  Be nice so target will want to comply with your request (5) 
 Pleading: I need your compliance very badly, so please do it for me (14) 
 Aversive Stimulation: Punish until they comply with your request (8) 
 Moral Appeal: You are immoral if you do not comply (9) 
 Positive Self-feeling:  You will feel better about yourself if you comply (10) 
 Negative Self-feeling: You will feel worse about yourself if you do not comply (11) 
 Positive Expertise: If you comply, good things will happen to you (3) 
 Negative Expertise: If you don’t comply, bad things will happen to you (4) 
 Positive Traits:  A good person would comply (12) 
 Negative Traits: A bad person would not comply (13) 
 Positive Esteem: People you care about will think better of you if you comply (15) 
 Negative Esteem: People you care about will think worse of you if you do not comply 
(16) 
 Other/none of the above/classified (17) 
Q34 On a scale from 1 to 10, rate how successful your influence attempt was. 
 1 Not at all successful (1) 
 2 (2) 
 3 (3) 
 4 (4) 
 5 (5) 
 6 (6) 
 7 (7) 
 8 (8) 
 9 (9) 
 Extremely successful 10 (10) 
Q35 What evidence helped you evaluate how successful your influence attempt was? 
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 Directly observed a change/no change in behavior (1) 
 Person/people involved directly expressed different/unchanged beliefs/attitudes (2) 
 Reports/data from US/allied personnel (3) 
 Told by local person/people about the impact of your influence attempt (4) 
 Official data/news reports, including statistics about voting, survey data, school 
enrollment, etc (5) 
 Other/none of the above/classified (6) 
Q36 What aspects of the situation were favorable and/or unfavorable to your influence 
attempt? Check all that apply: 
 + Favorable (1) - Unfavorable 
(2) 
Level of conflict among local groups (1)     
Availability/skill of translators in relevant 
language (2)     
Your own knowledge about local culture (3)     
Specific US action/failure to act in local area (4)     
Other recent events/developments in the local area 
(5)     
General US policy in country/region (6)     
Recent actions/failure to act by local 
government/leadership/police (7)     
Recent events in the country/region generally (8)     
Other/none of the above/classified (9)     
 
Q37 Rate how important empathy (understanding other peoples feelings) was in your 
influence attempt. 
 1 Not at all important (1) 
 2 (2) 
 3 (3) 
 4 (4) 
 5 (5) 
 6 (6) 
 7 (7) 
 8 (8) 
 9 (9) 
 Extremely important 10 (10) 
Q38 Rate how important showing respect was in your influence attempt. 
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 1 Not at all important (1) 
 2 (2) 
 3 (3) 
 4 (4) 
 5 (5) 
 6 (6) 
 7 (7) 
 8 (8) 
 9 (9) 
 Extremely important 10 (10) 
Q39 How important were prior relationships with the person or people you were trying to 
influence? 
 1 Not at all important (1) 
 2 (2) 
 3 (3) 
 4 (4) 
 5 (5) 
 6 (6) 
 7 (7) 
 8 (8) 
 9 (9) 
 Extremely important 10 (10) 
Q40 How important was understanding of the local culture for your influence attempt? 
 1 Not at all important (1) 
 2 (2) 
 3 (3) 
 4 (4) 
 5 (5) 
 6 (6) 
 7 (7) 
 8 (8) 
 9 (9) 
 Extremely important 10 (10) 
Q41 What cultural factors played an important role in your influence attempt? Check all 
that apply: 
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 Respecting, acknowledging, and being open to cultural differences (8) 
 Basic differences between US and Iraqi culture (7) 
 Differences between tribes, religious groups, such as the differences between Sunni, 
Shi'a, and Kurds (1) 
 Religious practices, such as prayer times, dietary restrictions, Ramadan, etc (4) 
 Gender roles, such as favoritism for boys over girls (2) 
 Importance of saving face, maintaining, honor, national pride (11) 
 Importance of family (3) 
 How business is conducted, such as negotiation styles or the use of bribes (5) 
 Power of individuals to make changes versus reliance on God/Allah (12) 
 How authority and leadership status are determined in local culture (6) 
 Cultural conception of time, such as sense of urgency, punctuality, etc (10) 
 Other/none of the above/classified (9) 
Q42 Check all of the influence techniques you used while deployed to Iraq: 
 Reward:  If you comply, I will reward you (1) 
 Punishment: If you don’t comply, I will punish you (2) 
 Debt: You owe me compliance because of past favors (7) 
 Gift: Give gift, then make request (6) 
 Liking:  Be nice so target will want to comply with your request (5) 
 Pleading: I need your compliance very badly, so please do it for me (14) 
 Aversive Stimulation: Punish until they comply with your request (8) 
 Moral Appeal: You are immoral if you do not comply (9) 
 Positive Self-feeling:  You will feel better about yourself if you comply (10) 
 Negative Self-feeling: You will feel worse about yourself if you do not comply (11) 
 Positive Expertise: If you comply, good things will happen to you (3) 
 Negative Expertise: If you don’t comply, bad things will happen to you (4) 
 Positive Traits:  A good person would comply (12) 
 Negative Traits: A bad person would not comply (13) 
 Positive Esteem: People you care about will think better of you if you comply (15) 
 Negative Esteem: People you care about will think worse of you if you do not comply 
(16) 
 None of the above while deployed to Iraq (17) 
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